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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
National Banking Association, 
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a National corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered July 1, 1997 against First 
Security Financial ("Bank") and in favor of 4447 Associates ("4447"). The Bank filed this 
appeal in the Utah Supreme Court (No. 970382), which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). On November 5, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court poured 
1 
No. 970644-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
over this appeal to this Court for disposition (No. 970644-CA). This Court of Appeals thus 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is the Bank precluded from asserting that Section 70A-9-318(2) should apply 
where the trial court twice found, assuming arguendo that the statute applied, that the Bank 
presented insufficient evidence to establish any defense under the statute and the Bank failed 
to appeal those findings. Entry of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness.1 This 
issue is preserved at R. 1783-1868,1896-1981. When challenging findings of fact entered by 
the trial court after trial on remand, an appellant must marshal all evidence supporting the 
finding in order to demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the finding.2 This issue is preserved at R.2155-71. 
2. Does this Court's prior, final decision applying Section 70A-9-318(l) to this 
case and rejecting application of Section 70A-9-318(3) preclude the Bank from attempting 
to assert defenses under Section 70A-9-318(3) on remand regardles of the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision interpreting Section 70A-9-318(3) prior to entry of judgment by the trial 
xReinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App.l993)(czYmg Bountiful 
v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
2Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct. App.l993))(c/Ymg 
Grayson Roper Ltd, v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
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court. The trial court's legal rulings are reviewed for correctness.3 This issue is preserved 
at R. 1783-1868,1896-1981, 2155-71. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly awarded 4447 attorney fees and costs as the 
prevailing party under the Asset Purchase Agreement where appellant failed to make 
payments required by the Asset Purchase Agreement. This Court reviews the trial court's 
legal rulings for correctness.4 This issue is preserved at R.1908-12. 
The Bank appeals questions of law. The Bank has failed to challenge factual findings 
made by the trial court. Therefore, those factual findings are not before this Court. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
This case was decided by the trial court sitting without a jury. On summary judgment, 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is determinative. See Addendum A. As to questions 
regarding the assignment, Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-318 is determinative. See 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Complaint filed in this case on March 3, 1987, alleging that through a settlement 
agreement the Bank and Capitol Thrift & Loan ("Capitol") wrongfully attempted to 
extinguish the Bank's obligations to Capitol. By assignment, Zions became entitled to 
'Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1998). 
"Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1998). 
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receive the payments and the Bank received notice of the assignment. However, the Bank 
failed to obtain permission from or give notice to 4447 regarding the settlement agreement 
which purported to extinguish the Bank's obligation. 4447 asked the trial court to order the 
Bank to pay the amount owing including attorney fees and costs. (R. 6-7.) The Bank 
answered the Complaint, denied liability saying it had not received notice of the assignment. 
(R. 42-46.) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On May 24, 1990, the trial court granted the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and determined that the principal amount owed to Capitol under the Purchase 
Agreements should be adjusted downward by $1,000,000. (R. 398) 
Following a bench trial on January 6-7, 1992, the trial court issued a Memorandum 
Decision on January 30, 1992, (R. 702-11), and a judgment on November 3, 1992, (R. 783-
84), in the Bank's favor. This Court reversed the trial court on January 6, 1995 and 
remanded the case for entry of "an appropriate judgment" in favor of 4447. 889 P.2d 467, 
476 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Bank unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari. (R. 1687.) 
On remand, the trial court granted 4447fs motion for partial summary judgment and 
the Bank filed several motions assailing the judgment. After denying the Bank's remaining 
defenses, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 4447 and the Bank filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are in the record from the trial court: 
THE PARTIES AND THE PURCHASE AGREEMENTS 
4 
1. The Bank purchased certain assets of Capitol under the terms of an asset 
purchase agreement (the "Asset Purchase Agreement"). (R. 679.) 
2. The Asset Purchase Agreement required the Bank to pay Capitol $ 1,077,777.42 
on December 13, 1985. (R. 679.) The Asset Purchase Agreement also required quarterly 
interest payments to Capitol of $25,194.44. Id. 
3. Paragraph 2 of the Asset Purchase Agreement permits the principal amount of 
the deferred portion of the purchase price to be adjusted downward not more than 
$1,000,000, if the "actual and anticipated losses on the collection of the amount of the 
receivables as of the Closing Date exceed the reserve for losses as of the Closing Date". (R. 
10.) Paragraph 1 of the Closing Agreement defines the Closing Date "for all purposes" of 
the Purchase Agreements as December 13, 1982. (R. 18.) 
4. Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") was president and chief executive 
officer of Capitol until the fall of 1982. (R. 679.) Christenson became the president, chief 
operating officer, and a director of the Bank at its inception in December 1982, and served 
in those positions until November 1984. Id. 
5. On about September 28, 1984, Capitol and Zions entered into an Assignment 
and Security Agreement (the "Assignment"). The Assignment gave Zions a security interest 
in the receivable owed by Bank under the Asset Purchase Agreements. (R. 24-36) 
6. In November 1984, shortly after the Assignment was executed and the 
underlying loan from Zions to Capitol was guaranteed by Christenson, the Bank terminated 
Christenson. (R. 972.) 
5 
7. Sometime between November 1984 and July 1985, Christenson was 
reappointed as chief executive officer of Capitol.5 
8. On or about July 10, 1985, the Bank, Christenson, and Capitol entered into a 
settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement")6 which purported to extinguish the 
Bank's obligation to Capitol under the Purchase Agreements even though the right to receive 
the payments was previously assigned. (R. 136-37.) 
9. The Settlement Agreement required the parties not to disclose the existence and 
terms of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 140.) 
10. As a condition of his agreement to execute the Settlement Agreement, 
Christenson was required to give the Bank an original signed personal financial statement 
and statement of Capitolfs financial condition. (R. 135-36) 
11. Prior to July 1985, Christenson delivered his personal financial statements 
which listed Capitol's receivable from the Bank under the Asset Purchase Agreements which, 
by footnote, revealed the following language: 
This represents my portion of the ownership of Capitol Thrift & Loan based 
on the contract amount I have with First Security Financial. This receivable 
has been pledged to Zions First National Bank, 
(R. 682-83)(Emphasis supplied.) 
5(R. 998 (lines 11-25) - 999 (line 1)); (R. 1004)(lines 22-25). 
6(R. 974 (lines 22-25) to 975 (lines 1-10)). 
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12. The received a third financial statement with identical language to that 
referenced above from Christenson's attorney prior to July 1985. (R. 683). 
13. Christenson testified at trial that no representative, personnel of or attorney for 
the Bank ever questioned him regarding his disclosure that the receivable evidenced by the 
Purchase Agreements was pledged to Zions. (R. 991.) 
14. Capitol did not default on its obligation to Zions secured by the Assignment 
until at least December 1985. (R. 682.) Thereafter, Zions questioned Christenson regarding 
the default. Only when Capitol failed to cure the default did Zions first learn of the 
Settlement Agreement. 
15. Zions, as assignee, sued the Bank, alleging that the collateral was wrongfully 
extinguished. (R. 2-39.) 
16. In June 1990, after the suit was filed, Zions assigned its rights to 4447. (R. 
780.) 
17. At trial, the trial court found that the Bank had not received adequate notice of 
the Assignment notwithstanding Christensen's written disclosures. (R. 709.) 
18. 4447 appealed (the "First Appeal"). Overturning the trial court, this Court 
determined that the Bank received adequate notice of the Assignment through Christensen's 
written disclosures. 889 P.2d 467, 474-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
19. This Court also ruled: 
Thus, in the context of an assignment, section 9-318 distinguishes 
between claims and defenses arising from the contract and other unrelated 
claims and defenses. An account debtor can assert claims and defenses based 
7 
on the terms of the contract whether they arise before or after notification of 
an assignment. However, subsection (l)(b) limits assertion of unrelated claims 
and defenses to those "which accrue[ ] before the account debtor receives 
notification of the assignment." Id. § 70A-9-318(l)(b) (emphasis added). See 
also West One Bank v. Life Tns. Co.: 887 P.2d 880, 885 n. 7 (Utah Ct. 
App.1994) (secured creditor need only give notice of its interest in order to 
have priority over later creditors subsequent right of setoff). Subsection (l)(b) 
does not specify a particular form of notice, but simply precludes an account 
debtor from raising a claim or defense against an assignee after the account 
debtor is aware that the assignment exists. 
The two-pronged notice requirement mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-9-318(3) (1990) is not applicable to our analysis. . . . According to the 
terms of section 9-318(l)(b), First Security, as an account debtor, can only 
succeed if its claim or defense accrued before it received notice of the 
assignment's existence. 
889 P.2d at 472, n.8 (emphasis added). 
20. This Court concluded: "Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part, and 
remand to the trial court for entry of an appropriate judgment in favor of 4447 Associates in 
accordance with this opinion." 889 P.2d at 476. 
21. On March 20, 1995, the Bank petitioned for certiorari. (R. 1686.) 
22. In its reply brief in support of its petition, the Bank raised for the first time 
defenses under Section 70A-9-318(2). See Addendum C, Reply Brief in Support of Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari at 3-4. 
23. On June 5, 1995, the Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari and this Court's 
decision in the First Appeal became final. (R.1687.) 
24. Collaterally, on June 19, 1995, the Bank petitioned for certiorari in a separate 
case, America First Credit Union v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., Case No. 940483-CA. 
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There, the Bank argued that: "In a recent case before a different Court of Appeals panel, the 
Court of Appeals refused to interpret and apply Section 9-318(3), the controlling statute in 
this case, under circumstances that, combined with the results of this case, creates uncertainty 
in application of what is a clear and unambiguous statute. See Zions First Nat'l Bank v. First 
Security Financial, 255 Utah Adv. Rep. 69, P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(eert denied 
(June 5, 1995). First Security respectfully requests that the issues be decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court so that there can exist more certainty in common commercial transactions 
involving collateral assignments of accounts." (R. 2008.) 
25. On September 21, 1995, the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 
America First case. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
26. However, the Utah Supreme Court's January 21, 1997 opinion neither 
overruled nor addressed this Court's decision in the First Appeal in this case. 930 P.2d 1198, 
1198-1202 (Utah 1997). 
27. Following remand in this case, the trial court by minute entry granted 4447's 
motion for summary judgment and denied the Bank's motion for a stay pending the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in America First. (R.2119-21.) 
28. On February 29, 1996, the trial court entered its Order on Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay, ruling that: 
1) First Security's indebtedness owed to 4447 Associates under the 
Asset Purchase Agreement, including principal and interest as of December 6, 
1995, is $266,757.25 as shown in detail below. From and after December 6, 
1995, interest shall continue to at the per diem rate of $33.51 in favor of 4447 
Associates and against First Security. 
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I. UNPAID INTEREST PAYMENTS 
Due Date of Interest 
Payment 
12/13/84 
3/13/85 
6/13/85 
Unpaid Amount 
$21,536.07 
24,849.31 
25,401.51 
Accrued 
Interest to 
December 6, 1995 
$23,660.18 
26,687.48 
26,640.27 
9/13/85 25,401.51 26,000.01 
12/13/85 25,125.41 25,717.41 
Subtotal 122,313.81 128,705.35 
II. UNPAID CONTRACT BALANCE 
12/13/85 7,777.42 
(After $1,000,000 Downward 
Adjustment on 12/13/85) 
7,960.67 
TOTAL (I & II) $266,757.25 
2) 4447 Associates' request for an award of attorney 
fees under the Asset Purchase Agreement is GRANTED in an 
amount to be determined at a later evidentiary hearing; however, 
4447 Associates is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
regarding First Security's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
which was granted by the court on May 24, 1990 and affirmed 
on appeal. 
3) First Security's defense under Section 70A-9-
318(2) is DENIED as the Settlement Agreement dated July 10, 
1985 was more than a modification of the contract within the 
meaning of Section 7QA-9-318(2); instead, the Settlement 
Agreement improperly attempted to terminate and discharge 
obligations owed under the Asset Purchase Agreement as found 
by the appellate court. 
10 
(R. 2150-52)(emphasis added). 
29. After reviewing further extensive memoranda and oral argument, the trial court 
denied the Bank's remaining challenges to the judgment, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on July 1, 1997. R. 2348-2359. Among other things, the trial court found that the 
Bank's defenses were inapplicable and were insufficient because the evidence was 
ambiguous: 
1. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support 
defendant's defenses to entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. The inferences 
which defendant requests the Court to draw from the ambiguous evidence 
admitted at trial and now argued by defendant are insufficient to establish 
defendant's defenses. Specifically: 
a. Defendant's defenses regarding its breach of 
warranty defenses and claims against Capitol Thrift and Richard 
Christenson are not supported by the evidence in the record. 
b. Defendant's defenses pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 70A-9-318, are not supported by the decision 
of the Court of Appeals and are not supported by the evidence 
in the record. 
c. Defendant's remaining defenses whereby it alleges 
that it is not obligated to pay plaintiff the payments owed under 
the Asset Purchase Agreement are likewise not supported by the 
evidence in the record. 
(R. 2352)(emphasis added). 
30. The trial court also found the following facts regarding the award of attorney 
fees, which were also stipulated to by the parties: 
2. Prior to hearing argument on attorney fees and costs, the parties 
stipulated that plaintiff incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs through 
February 28, 1997 in its prosecution of this action in the amount of 
11 
$103,358.40 and that defendant incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs in 
defense of this action in the amount of $107,824.60. The parties further 
stipulated that if plaintiff were entitled to attorney fees and costs the amount 
of attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff should be reduced in an amount 
equal to 10% of the total fees and costs of plaintiff for fees and costs incurred 
regarding defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and in an amount 
equal to 10% of the total attorney fees and costs of defendant for fees incurred 
in bringing the motion for partial summary judgment. The parties agreed not 
to challenge their respective attorney fees and costs except as to entitlement 
under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
3. The Court finds the parties' stipulation regarding attorney fees 
and costs to be reasonable under applicable Utah law. Specifically, plaintiff 
incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs through February 28, 1997 in its 
prosecution of this action in the amount of $103,358.40 and that defendant 
incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs in defense of this action in the 
amount of $107,824.60. Further, it is reasonable that attorney fees and costs 
the amount of attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff should be reduced 
in an amount equal to 10% of the total fees and costs of plaintiff for fees and 
costs incurred regarding defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and 
in an amount equal to 10% of the total attorney fees and costs of defendant for 
fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion for partial summary judgment. 
4. The Court further finds pursuant to the stipulation of the parties 
that the work described in the affidavits of counsel for plaintiff were actually 
performed, that the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter, and that the attorneys' and other paralegal's billing rates 
were consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services. The Court has further considered all other circumstances which 
require consideration of additional factors pursuant to Utah law, including 
those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility, and finds that fees and 
costs of $82,240.12 were reasonably and necessarily incurred by plaintiff in 
enforcing the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement, These fees and costs 
incurred are awardable as they were incurred and arose under paragraph 22 of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
5. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to an award 
of fees and costs of $82,240.12. 
R. 2352-2354 (emphasis added). 
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31. On July 29, 1997, the Bank filed its notice of appeal. R.2369-70. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court held in the First Appeal that Section 70A-9-318(1) applied to the facts of 
this case, not Section 70A-9-318(3). 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial 889 P.2d 
467, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court then remanded the case for "entry of an 
appropriate judgment in favor of 4447 Associates in accordance with this opinion." 889 P.2d 
at 476. Further, the Court defined the "appropriate judgment"; the Court found that the 
Bank's failure to give notice "entitles 4447 to an award of damages resulting therefrom, 
presumably the amount due on the account, as properly reduced in accordance with the terms 
of the asset purchase agreement as discussed above." 889 P.2d at 475 (emphasis added). 
On remand, the trial court properly rejected the Bank's requests to apply the America 
First decision and disregard this Court's mandate. The trial court also properly denied the 
Bank's defenses which were rejected in the First Appeal or which the Bank failed to raise at 
trial. The trial court was required to follow the mandate of this Court's decision in the First 
Appeal. I Jtah Copper Co v. Dist. Court., 64 P.2d 241,250 (Utah 1937); accord Dreyer v. Bd. 
of Trustees, 666 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Mont. 1983)(a trial court cannot refuse to carry out the 
mandate of the appellate court). Accordingly, the trial court correctly entered judgment for 
4447 for all amounts due under the Asset Purchase Agreement. R. 2150-52, 2357-58. 
It is time that the Bank's endless assertion of defenses to judgment are terminated. 
The Bank failed to assert defenses under Section 9-318(2) until after this Court's decision 
in the First Appeal. The Bank cannot retry the case on remand after the mandate is issued 
13 
to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of 4447. Further, the Bank may not assert its 
Section 9-318(3) defense on remand or in this appeal, as it was rejected in the First Appeal. 
Finally, notwithstanding the Bank's attempt to characterize it otherwise, the parties' dispute 
arises under the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement because 4447 was seeking recovery 
of amounts due thereunder. 
4447 respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment and grant 
its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BANK MAY NOT ASSERT DEFENSES UNDER SECTION 70A-9-
318(2) IN THIS APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FOUND 
THAT, THE BANK'S EVIDENCE OF ITS SECTION 9-318(2) 
DEFENSE WAS "INSUFFICIENT" AND THE BANK HAS NOT 
APPEALED THAT FINDING OR MARSHALED EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THAT FINDING IN ITS INITIAL BRIEF. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED BY THE BANK DID NOT PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE BANK HAS NOT 
APPEALED THAT RULING. 
The Bank argues that the trial court erred in holding that the Bank and Capitol were 
not entitled to modify the Asset Purchase Agreement under Section 70A-9-318(2) by the 
Settlement Agreement. (Bank Brief at 16-18.)7 The Bank raised this defense on remand 
7The Bank presented this defense for the first time in its reply brief in support of its 
petition for writ of certiorari, see Addendum C, which was rejected by the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Bank failed to preserve this issue for appeal in the First Appeal and it cannot 
be raised on remand thereafter for the first time. See infra, Section I. D.; ("Furthermore, 
if a party fails to raise an issue and present evidence regarding the same, it has waived the 
right to do so." Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 897 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct. 
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after entry of this Court's prior decision in opposition to 4447fs motion for summary 
judgment and failed to present evidence supporting its claims in opposition to 4447fs motion 
for summary judgment. (R. 1871-78.)8 Because the Bank raised after entry of this Court's 
decision in the First Appeal, this issue was not properly before the trial court and is not 
preserved for this appeal. 
Section 70A-9-318(2) requires that "the assignee acquires corresponding rights under 
the modified or substituted contract."9 While the Bank alleges that the Settlement Agreement 
modified or was in substitution of the obligations under the Asset Purchase Agreement under 
Section 70A-9-318(2), 4447 received no "corresponding rights under the modified or 
substituted contract." Instead, the Bank wrongfully sought to terminate 4447fs rights, leaving 
4447 with nothing. This Court observed: 
App. 1995)(quating Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Tax ComirTn, 847 P.2d 418,420 (Utah 
Ct. App.1993); Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns: Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 
1984)(citations omitted)(emphasis added)). 
8The Bank further failed to respond to 4447fs Undisputed Material Facts as 
required by Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. R.l 869-71,1896-1897. 
9Section 70A-9-318(2) provides: 
So far as the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned 
contract has not been fully earned by performance, and notwithstanding 
notification of the assignment, any modification of or substitution for the 
contract made in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial 
standards is effective against an assignee unless the account debtor has 
otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding rights under the 
modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide that such 
modification or substitution is a breach by the assignor. 
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[Ajctual knowledge of the assignment's existence precludes substantial 
interference with the assignee's rights, Legal commentators have noted that 
under the UCC, an assignee's rights may be adversely affected by contract 
modifications made by the account debtor and the assignor, but such actions 
are 'unwarranted* if the assignee's rights are jeopardized by termination of the 
contract or similar unilateral action. 
889 P.2d at 475 (emphases added). Accordingly, the Asset Purchase Agreement was not 
properly modified under Section 70A-9-318(2) as 4447 received no corresponding rights in 
the Settlement Agreement. 
The trial court on remand rejected the Bank's defense under Section 9-318(2). In its 
order granting partial summary judgment, the trial court on remand found that the Settlement 
Agreement did not extinguish the Bank's obligation to 4447: "First Security's defense under 
Section 70A-9-318(2) is denied as the Settlement Agreement dated July 10, 1985 was more 
than a modification of the contract within the meaning of Section 70A-9-318(2); instead, the 
Settlement Agreement improperly attempted to terminate and discharge obligations owed 
under the Asset Purchase Agreement as found by the appellate court/' R. 2152 (emphasis 
added). Significantly, the Bank has not cited or attached this Order, (R. 2150-54), and has 
not questioned the trial court's reasoning. Further, on summary judgment the Bank failed 
to properly controvert 4447's undisputed facts as required under Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code 
of Judicial Admin. (R. 1869-71, 1896-97). Accordingly, because the Bank has failed to 
properly cite the order at issue, it has failed to preserve its Section 9-318(2) defense on 
appeal and the trial court's ruling is unassailable. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE BANK'S EVIDENCE 
OF A SECTION 9-318(2) DEFENSE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
PRIOR TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
The trial court again rejected the Bank's Section 9-318(2) argument prior to entry of 
judgment when the Bank again reargued that the Settlement Agreement modified and 
extinguished the indebtedness owed under the Asset Purchase Agreement, including interest 
payments. (R. 2125-26, 2179-80.) The Bank alleged that certain defenses had accrued 
which entitled the Bank to offset amounts owed to 4447 and to modify the obligations owed 
under the Asset Purchase Agreement because of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 2125-26, 
2179-80.) Following careful review of the Bank's "evidence" concerning modification of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement, the trial court found the Bank's evidence was insufficient: 
There is insufficient evidence in the record to support defendant's defenses to 
entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff The inferences which defendant 
requests the Court to draw from the ambiguous evidence admitted at trial and 
now argued by defendant are insufficient to establish defendant's defenses. 
(R. 2352(emphasis added).) 
The Bank has not appealed this finding. It is not before this Court. See Bank Brief 
at 1-2. Accordingly, even if the Bank could assert defenses under Section 70A-9-318(2)(and 
it cannot), the unappealed trial court finding of insufficient evidence of that defense is fatal 
to the Bank's Section 9-318(2) challenge. 
C. THE BANK HAS WAIVED ANY SECTION 70A-9-318(2) 
DEFENSE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PRESERVED AT TRIAL. 
Even if a Section 9-318(2) defense were applicable and supported by evidence (and 
it is not), the Bank waived it. The Bank argued on remand that Section 70A-9-318(2) 
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entitled the Bank and Capitol to modify the Asset Purchase Agreement and extinguish 4447fs 
interest. (R. 1871-78.) However, the Bank may not argue new legal or factual positions on 
remand that were not addressed at trial: 
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is inappropriate and outside of 
the discretion given the governing tribunal because it encroaches upon the 
advocate responsibility conferred upon counsel. Furthermore, if a party fails 
to raise an issue and present evidence regarding the same, it has waived the 
right to do so. 
Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm, of Utah, 897 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(quoling 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 847 P.2d 418,420 (Utah Ct. App.1993); Combe 
v. Warrenfs Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984)(citations 
omitted)(emphasis added). By failing to assert its Section 70A-9-318(2) "defense" at trial, 
the Bank waived the argument or, alternatively, is now barred from asserting it on remand. 
See also Pretrial Order (omitting Section 70A-9-318(2) as a defense). (R. 675-94.) 
II. THE BANK MAY NOT REARGUE THE SECTION 70A-9-318(3) 
DEFENSE PREVIOUSLY REJECTED BY THIS COURT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS 
COURT'S PRIOR, FINAL DECISION APPLYING SECTION 
70A-9-318(l) PRECLUDES THE BANK'S SECTION 70A-9-318(3) 
ON REMAND. 
The Bank next incorrectly challenges the trial court's decision to preclude the Bank's 
alleged Section 70A-9-318(3) defense. (Bank Brief at 8-15.) This Court already addressed 
and rejected this very argument, holding that Section 70A-9-318(1) applied here. 889 P.2d 
at 472, n.8. The Court put it this way: 
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The two-pronged notice requirement mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-9-318(3) (1990) is not applicable to our analysis. Section 9-318(3) sets 
forth the notice requirements for an assignee to receive payments directly from 
the account debtor. Tn the instant case, the question of whether Zions was 
entitled to receive payments from First Security as they came due does not 
merit consideration. 
889 P.2d at 472, n.8 (emphasis added). This Court also stated: 
The parties also debate the question of whether First Security ever received, 
beyond mere notice of the assignment, notice to make payment directly to 
Zions as contemplated in I Jtah Code Ann. § 70A-9- 318(3) (1990). Tt clearly 
did not, and we decline to address the issue further, See, e.g., State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (declining to consider issues without merit); 
State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah Ct. App.1992) (same), cert, denied, 
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Id. at 470, n.5. Construing section 9-318, the Court found that, in the context of an 
assignment, section 9-318 distinguishes between claims and defenses arising from the 
contract and other unrelated claims and defenses. 889 P.2d at 472. An account debtor can 
assert claims and defenses based on the terms of the contract whether they arise before or 
after notification of an assignment. Id. This Court then stated: 
However, subsection (l)(b) limits assertion of unrelated claims and defenses 
to those "which accrue[ ] before the account debtor receives notification of the 
assignment.,f Id. § 70A-9-318(l)(b) (emphasis added). See also West One 
Bank v. Life Tns. Co.: 887 P.2d 880, 885 n. 7 (Utah Ct. App.1994) (secured 
creditor need only give notice of its interest in order to have priority over later 
creditor's subsequent right of setoff). Subsection (l)(b) does not specify a 
particular form of notice, but simply precludes an account debtor from raising 
a claim or defense against an assignee after the account debtor is aware that the 
assignment exists. 
According to the terms of section 9-318(l)(b), First Security, as an account 
debtor, can only succeed if its claim or defense accrued before it received 
notice of the assignment's existence. 
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889 P.2d at 472. On remand, the trial court followed this Court's decision in the First Appeal 
and found, "Defendant's defenses pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-318(3) 
are not supported by the decision of the Court of Appeals " (R. 2352 (emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, the trial court properly precluded the Bank from asserting defenses under 
Section 70A-9-318(3) pursuant to this Court's prior decision. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE BANK'S 
ARGUMENT UNDER AMERTCA FIRST, 
The Utah Supreme Court decided America First, interpreting Section 70A-9-318(3), 
while this case was on remand but prior to entry of judgment. The Bank incorrectly suggests 
that America First governs and required the trial court to apply Section 70A-9-318(3). 
(Bank's Brief at 9-15.) America First does not assist here because this Court's ruling in the 
First Appeal did not involve application of Section 70A-9-318(3). 4447 Associates, 889 P.2d 
at 472, n.8. This Court held that Section 70A-9-318(l) applied, not Section 70A-9-318(3). 
868 P.2d at 472, n.8. Construing Section 70A-9-318, the Court held that the subsections 
"distinguish[] between claims and defenses arising from the contract and other unrelated 
claims and defenses." 889 P.2d at 472. This holding was not reversed (nor even questioned) 
by the America First Court; despite the Bank's request that the Supreme Court in America 
Eksl overturn this Court's decision in the First Appeal. (R. 2007-08.) See America First, 
930 P.2d at 1198-1202. 
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that America First did not apply on remand: 
This Court has the authority to consider and apply the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in America First Credit Union v. First Security of Utah, No. 95074 
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(Utah January 21,1997); however, the America First decision is not applicable 
to this action as the Court's decision interprets Utah Code Annotated Section 
70A-9-31S(3)T not Section 70A-9-318(l). 
(R. 2355 (emphasis added).) Which subsection of Section 70A-9-318 to apply here was 
decided in the First Appeal and is now final as law of the case and is res judicata. 
The Bank also filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court in the 
First Appeal and argued that Section 70A-9-318(3) applied to this case, not Section 9-318(1). 
See Addendum C at 1-4. Under law of the case principles, issues decided or which could 
have been decided if properly raised, cannot be raised after remand. QL Baker v. Lane Co., 
586 P.2d 114 (Or. App. 1978); Adamson v. Traylor, 402 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1985); C&J 
Industries, Inc. v. Bailey, 669 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1983)(ffthe express ruling by this Court 
on all issues raised by prior appeal becomes the law of the case and is binding upon the 
parties, the trial court, and this court."); Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assfn v. St. Paul 
Ins. Companies, 448 P.2d 724 (Utah 1968). Accordingly, under res judicata and law of the 
case doctrines, the Bank cannot again raise its Section 70A-9-318(3) defense, previously 
rejected by this Court. 889 P.2d at 472, n.8. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED 4447 ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS AS THE PREVAILING PARTY UNDER THE 
ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
With the Bank's liability fixed, the trial court correctly found that 4447 prevailed on 
disputes "arising under" the Asset Purchase Agreement, and properly awarded attorney's fees 
consistent with this Court's decision in the First Appeal. 889 P.2d 467, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). Ignoring the foundation for this issue (the Asset Purchase Agreement), the Bank 
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assails the attorneys' fees award by casting the dispute with 4447 as one not "aris[ing] under" 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. (Bank Brief at 19.) The Bank, instead, says the dispute 
centers on whether the Bank "received notice of a subsequent assignment of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement." Id. Characterization, it seems, means everything. 
This dispute is simply said: Was 4447 entitled to interest payments, the remaining 
principal and attorney fees and costs due under the Asset Purchase Agreement. On remand, 
the trial court found that 4447 was so entitled. (R.2150-52.) This Court recognized in the 
First Appeal that the Asset Purchase Agreement enabled 4447 to recover amounts owed 
under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 868 P.2d at 475 ("[The Bank's] failure to . . .[notify 
plaintiff] entitles 4447 Associates to an award of damages resulting therefrom, presumably 
the amount due on the account, as properly reduced in accordance with the terms of the asset 
purchase agreement as discussed above.")(Emphasis added). In sum, the Bank's view that 
the dispute with 4447 did not arise under the Asset Purchase Agreement is mystical at best. 
The trial court also found that the fees awarded were "reasonably and necessarily incurred 
by plaintiff [4447] in enforcing the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement. These fees and 
costs incurred are awardable as they were incurred and arose under paragraph 22 of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement." (R. 2354.) Again, the Bank does not appeal this finding and failed 
to marshal evidence supporting it.10 Thus, whether the fees were reasonably and necessarily 
"Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct. App.l993))(c/ft>ig 
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
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incurred in enforcing the Asset Purchase Agreement is not before this Court. The trial court 
correctly awarded attorneys' fees to 4447 under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
IV. 4447 IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Drawn again into further proceedings on appeal, it is reasonable and proper for this 
Court to award 4447 additional attorneys' fees and costs incurred defending the present 
appeal. The Bank challenges 4447fs entitlement to prevail under the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. 4447 has established in the trial court and here that it prevails under the Asset 
Purchase Agreement. Regardless of how the Bank characterizes things, the continuing 
"dispute" arises under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 4447 is entitled to an award of 
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons show above, 4447 respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's judgment and grant its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal under the Asset 
Purchase Agreement. 
DATED this 13th day of August, 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
/Jeffrey M. Jones 
( / Mark Gibb 
Attorneys for 4447 Associates 
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Tab A 
RCP Rule 56, RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 
*119 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Current with amendments received through 
11-15-97 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover 
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time 
after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits 
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or 
any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom 
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted 
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any 
time, move with or without supporting affidavits 
for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or 
any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The 
motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed 
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If 
on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief 
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts 
are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the 
facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as 
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; 
Defense Required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
*120 (f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it 
appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for 
the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party employing them to pay to the 
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
RCP Rule 56, RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997.] 
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UT ST § 70A-9-318, Defenses against assignee-Modification of contract after notification of Page 1 
assignment-Term prohibiting assignment ineffective-Identification and proof of assignment 
Utah Code § 70A-9-318 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9. SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS-SALES OF 
ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS 
AND CHATTEL PAPER 
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD 
PARTIES-PERFECTED AND 
UNPERFECTED SECURITY 
INTERESTS-RULES OF PRIORITY 
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 
2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 70A-9-318. Defenses against assignee-
Modification of contract after 
notification of assignment—Term 
prohibiting assignment ineffective-
Identification and proof of assignment 
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an 
enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or 
claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 
70A-9-206 the rights of an assignee are subject 
to: 
(a) all the terms of the contract between the 
account debtor and assignor and any defense or 
claim arising therefrom; and 
(b) any other defense or claim of the account 
debtor against the assignor which accrues before 
the account debtor receives notification of the 
assignment. 
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part 
thereof under an assigned contract has not been 
fully earned by performance, and notwithstanding 
notification of the assignment, any modification 
of or substitution for the contract made in good 
faith and in accordance with reasonable 
commercial standards is effective against an 
assignee unless the account debtor has otherwise 
agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding 
rights under the modified or substituted contract. 
The assignment may provide that such 
modification or substitution is a breach by the 
assignor. 
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the 
assignor until the account debtor receives 
notification that the amount due or to become due 
has been assigned and that payment is to be made 
to the assignee. A notification which does not 
reasonably identify the rights assigned is 
ineffective. If requested by the account debtor, 
the assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable 
proof that the assignment has been made and 
unless he does so the account debtor may pay the 
assignor. 
(4) A term in any contract between an account 
debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it prohibits 
assignment of an account or prohibits creation of 
a security interest in chattel paper or a security 
interest in a general intangible for money due or 
to become due or requires the account debtor's 
consent to such assignment or security interest. 
*20850 As last amended by Chapter 197, Laws of Utah 
1990. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318 (1990): 
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable 
agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale 
as provided in Section 70A-9-206 the rights of an assignee are 
subject to: 
(a) all the terms of the contract 
between the account debtor and assignor and 
any defense or claim arising therefrom; and 
(b) any other defense or claim of the 
account debtor against the assignor which 
accrues before the account debtor receives 
notification of the assignment• 
(2) So far as the right to payment or a party thereof 
under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by 
performance, and notwithstanding notification of the assignment, 
any modification of or substitution for the contract made in good 
faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards is 
effective against an assignee unless the account debtor has 
otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding rights 
under the modified or substituted contract. The assignment may 
provide that such modification or substitution is a breach by the 
assignor. 
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the 
assignor until the account debtor receives notification that the 
amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is 
to be made to the assignee. A notification which does not 
reasonably identify the rights assigned is ineffective. If 
requested by the account debtor, the assignee must seasonably 
furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made and 
unless he does so the account debtor may pay the assignor. 
iv 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
SECTION 70A-9-318(l) BECAUSE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
IN THIS INSTANCE AROSE FROM THE ASSET PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT. 
The court of appeals incorrectly held that the 
Settlement Agreement in this case was "totally unrelated to" the 
original contract. 4447 Associates argues the Settlement 
Agreement does not arise from the terms of the contract because 
it covers more obligations than represented by the Purchase 
Agreements. For example, 4447 Associates points out that the 
Settlement Agreement covers Christenson's claim against First 
Security for wrongful termination. 
4447 Associates argues that "the Purchase Agreements 
make no reference to Christenson at all." Respondent's Brief in 
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11. This is 
simply incorrect. The Asset Purchase Agreement states: "[I]t is 
of the essence to this transaction that Capitol's president and 
executive vice president, Richard A. Christenson and Bruce L. 
Moesser, respectively, become officers in FS Financial." See 
Asset Purchase Agreement at 5 (emphasis added) (for the court's 
convenience, a copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement is attached 
as Addendum A) . 
Further, 4447 Associates' argument overlooks the court 
of appeals' own finding that Richard Christenson's financial 
statement, which was submitted in conjunction with the Settlement 
1 
Agreement, had a "uniquely close nexus to the main purpose of the 
Settlement Agreement." Addendum A to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 12 (emphasis added). 
4447 Associates also asserts that the Settlement 
Agreement does not arise out of the terms of the Purchase 
Agreements because of mention made in the Settlement Agreement of 
certain claims involving property in East Canyon and a personal 
guaranty of Christenson. However, the only reason these items 
are mentioned in the Settlement Agreement is to exclude them from 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Far from establishing 
that the Settlement Agreement covers items not arising from the 
Purchase Agreements, the exclusion of extraneous items actually 
demonstrates that the Settlement Agreement does arise from the 
terms of the Purchase Agreements. 
4447 Associates argues that courts have held that 
settlement agreements do not arise from the terms of a contract. 
In support of its argument 4447 Associates cites no Utah cases. 
The two cases it does cite do not apply here. In Bank Leumi 
Trust Co. v. Collins Sales Serv.• 393 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1979), the 
court held that section 318 did not apply to an agreement made to 
set off moneys owed to a third party that was not a party to the 
underlying agreement. Id. at 470. In In re Bancroft Dairy, 
Inc.. 10 B.R. 920 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981), there was a question 
as to whether the terms of the settlement agreement in the case 
"were ever carried out." Id. at 923. Further, the Bancroft 
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court was careful to note that "considering the release agreement 
itself as a separate defense, not arising from the terms of the 
contract, does not prevent the account debtors from asserting 
defenses which may have been considered when the parties were 
negotiating the release agreement." Id. at 925. Thus at the 
very least, the Bancroft case, which is cited by 4447 Associates, 
stands for the proposition that the case should be remanded to 
the district court so that if Zions is not subject to the 
Settlement Agreement, at least First Security will be able to 
assert against Zions' assignee the defense that Capitol breached 
its warranties to First Security under the Purchase Agreements 
concerning the quality of the assets it was selling to First 
Security. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT MAY AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT ON THE BASIS OF SECTION 70A-9-318 (2). 
First Security has argued that section 70A-9-318(2) 
supports the argument that First Security was entitled to settle 
its differences with its original creditor. 4447 Associates 
argues that this is a new argument that cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. First, the argument is not a new one. 
First Security has consistently argued that it was free to pay 
its original creditor through the means of a settlement 
agreement. First Security has merely offered additional support 
for its argument. This is no different from 4447 Associates' 
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citing the appellate court to additional cases that were not 
brought to the attention of the district court. 
Further, Utah case law is clear that the appellate 
court can affirm the decision of the lower court on any proper 
basis, even if it was not considered by the district court. See. 
e.g.. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 
1988). 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 70A-
9-318(3) DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
First Security argued to the court of appeals that 
section 70A-9-318(3) authorized First Security to satisfy its 
obligation to its original creditor until it received notice of 
(1) the assignment and (2) the duty to begin paying Zions 
directly. 4447 Associates argues that a settlement agreement 
cannot constitute "payment11 under section 318 (3).l The question 
of whether a settlement agreement can constitute a payment is an 
important question that should be decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 4447 Associates offers no Utah cases for its contention 
that settlement agreements cannot constitute payments. As 
pointed out above, the two cases cited by 4447 Associates from 
other jurisdictions do not apply here. Therefore, the court 
1
 4447 Associates also argues that First Security failed to 
raise this issue below. However, in response to questions at 
oral argument First Security cited the court of appeals to the 
case of Judah AMC & Jeep, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co.. 293 
N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa 1980). That case holds that under section 
318(3), which authorizes a debtor to "pay" the original creditor, 
a debtor had a right to "settle" with its creditor. 
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should grant the petition for certiorari so that this important 
question concerning commercial law can be decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FOOTNOTE 
IN CHRISTENSON'S FINANCIAL STATEMENT CONSTITUTED 
SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE ASSIGNMENT. 
4447 Associates argues that the Time Finance case is 
not applicable. However, it is the only Utah case cited by 
either party on the question of the type of notice that must be 
received by an account debtor. 4447 Associates has offered no 
reason why different policies should apply to commercial 
transactions than to insurance transactions. This court should 
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari so that the supreme 
court can clarify the important issue of what kind of notice must 
be received by an account debtor. 
CQNCLVglQN 
For the foregoing reasons, First Security Financial 
respectfully requests that this court issue a Writ of Certiorari 
and review the decision of the court of appeals in this case. 
DATED this fv day of May, 1995. 
RAY, OUINNEY &,NEBEKE/ 
Scott H. Clark 
Craig Carlile 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for First Security 
Financial, Defendant-
Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J&L>day of May, 1995, 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
J. Mark Gibb 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
50 South Main 
Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
and one copy was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Randall D. Benson 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
10 East South Temple 
Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Craig Carlile 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for First Security 
Financial, Defendant-
Appellee 
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ASSET PDRCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this If day 
of T^x-^t »^ -^ y> , 1982, by and between First Security 
Financial, a Utah corporation ("FS Financial"); Capitol Thrift and 
Loan Company, a Utah corporation ("Capitol"); Richard A. 
Christenson, an individual ("Christenson"); and Bruce L. Moesser, 
an individual ("Moesser"). 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. Capitol is an operating industrial loan corporation 
under the lavs of the State of Utah. 
B. Christenson is the majority stockholder of Capitol. 
C. Christenson and Moesser are the president and 
executive vice president of Capitol, respectively. 
D. FS Financial is a newly organized industrial loan 
corporation under the laws of the State of Utah. 
E. Upon consummation of the transactions contemplated 
here inr FS Financial will be a wholly owned subsidiary of First 
Security Corporation ("FS Corp."). 
F. FS Financial is in the process of acquiring the 
assets and liabilities of Murray First Thrift & Loan Company 
("MFT") pursuant to that certain Purchase and Assumption Agreement 
between FS Financial, FS Corp., MFT, et al., dated j)zcLmbu~ /5, 
1982 (the "MFT Agreement"). 
G. In connection with and contingent upon its 
acquisition of MFT, FS Financial desires also to acquire the 
assets of Capitol, and Capitol is willing to sell its assets to 
FS Financial, on the terms and conditions set forth below. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Purchase of Assets. Capitol hereby agrees to sell 
to FS Financial, and FS Financial hereby agrees to purchase from 
Capitol, all of the assets of Capitol as shown on the audited 
balance sheet of Capitol dated June 30, 1982, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof by this reference, subject to 
adjustment as provided in Paragraph 3 below. Included among the 
assets sold shall be all leases, insurance policies and other 
contract rights, and all books of account, customer records and 
documents of every nature relating to the business of Capitol 
being acquired by FS Financial. Not included among the assets 
sold shall be the corporate documents, books and records which 
relate to the overall organization and continuing financial 
affairs of Capitol and only those additional specific items of 
tangible and intangible personal property identified on Exhibit 
"B"r attached hereto and made a part hereof by this reference, and 
Capitol's leasehold interest in the premises currently occupied by 
it in the Continental Bank Building in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Consideration. As consideration for the purchase 
of the assets of Capitol, except as limited in the following 
sentence, FS Financial agrees to assume all of the liabilities of 
Capitol set forth on the balance sheet attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A," as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3 below, and also all 
liabilities of Capitol which may be asserted after the Closing 
Date which relate to the collection of any of the receivables of 
Capitol acquired by FS Financial and which were incurred in the 
normal course of business prior to the Closing Date, and to 
indemnify and hold Capitol harmless therefrom. Not included among 
the liabilities assumed shall be any liabilities of Capitol not 
expressly disclosed on said balance sheet (other than those 
incurred in the normal course of business prior to Closing which 
relate to the collection of receivables), any liabilities arising 
out of or in connection with Capitol's leasehold interest in its 
premises in the Continental Bank Building, and any accrued but 
unpaid wages, employment taxes, employee benefit plan liabilities, 
net income, franchise, sales, use, property and any other state or 
Federal tax liabilities, including any tax liabilities arising as 
a result of this transaction, and Capitol agrees to indemnify and 
hold FS Financial harmless therefrom. 
As further consideration, subject to adjustment as 
provided in Paragraph 3 below, FS Financial agrees to pay Capitol 
the sum pf One Million Three Hundred Seventy-Nine Thousand^Nine 
Hundred Eleven and 78/100 Dollars ($1,379,911.78) cash, payable as 
follows: 
(a) Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) at 
the Closing (hereinafter defined); 
(b) The balance of One Million One Hundred 
Seventy-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven and 78/100 
Dollars ($1,179,911.78) shall be paid in a lump sum on 
the third anniversary of the Closing Date; 
(c) The principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price shall earn interest at the rate of ten 
percent (10.0%) per annum and accrued interest shall be 
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paid in twelve (12) quarterly installments beginning 
three (3) months after the Closing Date. 
For purposes of arriving at the above purchase price, the assets 
of Capitol were valued at their book value and the cash portion 
of the purchase price was determined to be equal to the book net 
worth of Capitol as shown on the balance sheet attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
At the end of the three (3) year period of deferral and 
prior to the payment of the principal amount of the deferred 
portion of the purchase price, the real estate and receivables 
of Capitol acquired by FS Financial shall be valued in the manner 
set forth below. In the event that (i) the aggregate value of the 
real estate is less than its book value as of the Closing Date 
and/or (ii) the actual and anticipated losses on the collection of 
the amount of the receivables as of the Closing Date exceeds the 
reserve for losses as of the Closing Date, the principal amount 
of the deferred portion of the purchase price shall be adjusted 
downward in an equivalent amount. Further, the principal amount 
of the deferred portion of the purchase price shall also be 
adjusted downward in the amount of any liabilities of Capitol 
relating to the collection of receivables which were incurred 
in the normal course ot business prior to Closing bur were not 
disclosed on Cr-oitol's balance sheet at Closing and which were 
assumed by FS Financial hereunder. The aggregate of such downward 
adjustments of the principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price shall in no event exceed One Million Dollars 
($1,000,000.00). Notwithstanding any such downward adjustments 
of the principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase 
price, there shall be no adjustment of the amount of interest paid 
by FS Financial under Paragraph 2(c) hereof during the three (3) 
year period. 
~*Actual and anticipated losses on receivables shall 
include losses on those receivables already written off by FS 
Financial in accordance with standard' financial practice and FS 
Financial's actual experience and also one hundred percent 
(100.0%) of those receivables classified either as a "loss" or 
as "doubtful" by the Department of Financial Institutions in its 
most recent examination of FS Financial, provided one has been 
conducted within three (3) months prior to the end of the three 
(3) year period; provided, further, if no such examination has 
been conducted within the final three (3) months, the parties 
shall call for one. Out-of-pocket costs of collection incurred 
by FS Financial with respect to any such receivables (other than 
with respect to any liabilities relating to the collection of 
receivables which have been assumed by FS Financial hereunder), 
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including without limitation reasonable attorney's fees, shall be 
added to the principal amount of such receivables in determining 
the amount-of loss suffered thereon. Any such receivables which 
are written off by FS Financial or which are classified as a 
"loss" or as "doubtful" for purposes of this paragraph shall be 
reassigned to Capitol by FS Financial at the end of the three (3) 
year period. 
Any remaining unsold real estate at the end of the three 
(3) year period shall be valued by M.A.I, appraisal as of that 
time. To the extent any real estate has been sold during the 
three (3) year period, it shall be valued at its contract sales 
price. In both cases, the value of the real estate shall be 
reduced by the costs of sale and preparation for sale, such as 
necessary fix-up expenses, if any, incurred by FS Financial. 
In order to facilitate the above valuations, FS Financial 
shall keep its books in such a way that the receivables and real 
estate acquired from Capitol can be separately identified at all 
times during the three (3) year period. 
3. Changes Prior to Closing. To the extent there are 
changes in the assets, liabilities and net worth of Capitol 
between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date, which changes are a 
result of transactions entered into in the ordinary course of 
business, it is understood and agreed by the parties that those 
assets being sold by Capitol to FS Financial shall be the assets 
of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing Date, and that 
those liabilities being assumed by FS Financial shall be the 
liabilities of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing 
Date. Further, the principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price shall be adjusted up or down, as the case may 
be, in an amount equal to the change in the book net worth of 
Capitol between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date. For €his 
purpose,^Capitol shall prepare a balance sheet of those of its 
assets and liabilities as of the Closing Date which are included 
in the sale, complete with detailed schedules identifying 
individual assets and liabilities and also any off-balance sheet 
items included in the sale. At the Closing, the parties shall 
execute an appropriate amendment to this Agreement specifying the 
principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price as 
adjusted in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 
Capitol hereby represents and warrants that the balance 
sheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is true, complete and 
accurate in every material respect as of June 30, 1982, and that 
during the period beginning June 30, 1982, and ending on:the date 
of this Agreement there have been no material changes in the 
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assets and liabilities of Capitol other than as a result of 
transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business* 
Capitol hereby covenants and agrees that during the period 
beginning with the date of this Agreement and ending on the 
Closing Date, it shall not enter into any transactions other than 
in the regular course of business. Capitol further represents and 
warrants that the balance sheet to be prepared by it as of the 
Closing Date will be true, complete and accurate in every material 
respect as of the Closing Date. 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, it shall 
be a condition precedent to the obligation of FS Financial to 
close this transaction that there have been no material changes in 
the assets or liabilities of Capitol between June 30, 1962, and 
the Closing Date, and that the representations, warranties and 
covenants of Capitol contained in this Paragraph shall not have 
been breached in any material respect. 
4. Payment of Indemnity. The amount of any payment made 
by FS Financial or Capitol to a third party for which FS Financial 
or Capitol is entitled to indemnification hereunder shall accrue 
interest at the rate of ten percent (10.0%) per annum from the 
date of payment by FS Financial or Capitol to said third party 
through the date of reimbursement by the indemnifying party. If 
FS Financial is the party entitled to indemnification, it may 
require payment immediately or, at its option, it may set off the 
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity 
against the payments otherwise due Capitol under Subparagraphs 
2(b) and 2(c), respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3, 
above. If Capitol is the party entitled to indemnification, it 
may require payment immediately or, at its option, it may add the 
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity to 
the payments otherwise due it under Subparagraphs 2(b) and^2(c), 
respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3, above. ~ 
5. Personnel. It is contemplated that FS Financial will 
employ all of the current personnel of Capitol in FS Financial's 
operation. In particular, it is of the essence to this 
transaction that Capitol's president and executive vice president, 
Richard A. Christenson and Bruce L. Moesser, respectively, become 
officers in FS Financial. However, the terms of any such 
employment arrangement shall be subject to good faith negotiations 
between the parties and no assurances are given in this Agreement 
as to what the particulars of such employment arrangements can or 
will be. It is understood, however, that all employee benefits or 
claims, whether of a pension, health or other nature, which have 
accrued or which arise out of events prior to the Closing Date, 
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shall be and remain the sole liability of Capitol, and Capitol 
agrees to indemnify and hold FS Financial harmless therefrom. 
6. Noncompetition. During such time as Christenson and 
Moesser are employed by FS Financial, Christenson and Moesser 
covenant and agree, each for himself, that he will not engage, 
directly or indirectly, whether as sole proprietor, partner, 
shareholder, officer, director, employee or consultant, in any 
activity in the industrial loan, thrift and loan or banking 
industry in the State of Utah except as an officer and employee of 
FS Financial. It is understood that Christenson, Moesser, Sally 
Taylor, and Merlyn Hanks are officers and/or trustees of and will 
continue to have an ownership and participation in Franklin 
Financial, Cape Trust, the corporate entity surviving Capitol 
Thrift and Loan (which is contemplated to be named "The Capitol 
Company"), Capitol Leasing, Seahurst, and affiliated companies, 
and that they will be allowed to wind down and preserve the value 
of these assets without being in violation of the terms of this 
Agreement. 
If at any time Christenson or Moesser leave the employ of 
FS Financial, for any reason, Christenson and Moesser covenant and 
agree, each for himself, that he will not divulge or make use of 
any trade secrets, customer information or other confidential 
knowhow or information gained by him as a result of his employment 
by FS Financial nor will he solicit other persons to leave their 
employ with FS Financial, other than Christenson1s personal 
secretary, Sally Taylor. Also, for one (1) year after leaving the 
employ of FS Financial, Christenson agrees not to engage in any 
activity in direct competition with FS Financial in the thrift and 
loan industry. 
Further, Capitol agrees to change its name as of the 
Closing Date and to transfer to FS Financial at the Closing* all 
rights t5 the use of its name, but reserving to itself the right 
to use any other name which includes the name "Capitol* but not 
the words "Thrift and Loan" or any combination thereof. 
7. Government Approvals. It shall be a condition 
precedent to the obligation of FS Financial to close this 
transaction that FS Corp shall have received the prior approval 
of the Federal Reserve Board to acquire the shares of FS Financial 
in connection with FS Financial's acquisition of the assets and 
liabilities of Capitol and MFT as set forth herein and in the MFT 
Agreement. It shall be a further condition precedent hereto that 
the Utah Department of Financial Institutions shall have given its 
approval to this transaction, and that there be no other required 
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regulatory approval or consent which has not been obtained. It 
shall be a further condition precedent hereto that the MFT 
Agreement be consummated in accordance with' its terms. 
8. Closing. The closing of this transaction (the 
"Closing" or "Closing Date") shall take place at the same time and 
place and simultaneously with the closing of the MFT Agreement, 
but in no event later than six (6) months after the date of this 
Agreement. At the Closing, Capitol shall transfer title to those 
of its assets being sold to FS Financial by quit claim deed, bill 
of sale, or other appropriate instrument of transfer, and FS 
Financial shall assume all of the liabilities of Capitol which it 
has agreed to assume hereunder by an appropriate assumption 
agreement. At the Closing, FS Financial shall also pay to Capitol 
the portion of the purchase price payable under Paragraph 2(a) 
hereof, and the parties shall execute an appropriate amendment to 
this Agreement to specify the exact Closing Date and the principal 
amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price payable under 
Paragraph 2(b) hereof, as adjusted at the Closing pursuant to 
Paragraph 3 hereof. 
9. Guaranty. Christenson hereby guarantees that the 
representations and warranties made by Capitol herein are true, 
complete and accurate in every material respect as of the date 
for which they are made, and hereby guarantees the performance by 
Capitol of its obligation of indemnity with respect to liabilities 
and obligations of Capitol not assumed by FS Financial hereunder, 
such guaranties to be continuing, absolute, unconditional and 
primary. 
10. Press Releases. All parties agree that no press 
release or other statement, whether written or verbal, shall be 
made or given to any representative of the news media with respect 
to this transaction without the express prior approval of all 
other parties. 
11. Corporate Authority. Capitol represents and 
warrants that it is a duly organized, validly existing corporation 
in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah; that it is 
in full compliance with all laws, regulations, orders and other 
governmental rulings which regulate or purport to regulate 
Capitol's operation as an industrial loan corporation in the State 
of Utah; that it has full corporate power and authority to 
execute, deliver and carry out the provisions of this Agreement, 
including the necessary consent of its shareholders; and that when 
so executed and delivered this Agreement shall constitute a legal, 
valid and binding obligation of Capitol, enforceable against it in 
accordance with its terms. FS Financial represents and warrants 
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that it is a duly organized, validly existing corporation in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Utah; that it has full 
corporate power and authority to execute, deliver and carry out 
the provisions of this Agreement; and that when so executed and 
delivered this Agreement shall constitute a legal, valid and 
binding obligation of FS Financial, enforceable against it in 
accordance with its terms. The representations and warranties 
made in this paragraph shall be deemed made as of the date hereof 
and again at the Closing. Capitol and FS Financial agree to 
provide each other at the Closing with certified copies of Board 
of Directors and shareholder resolutions authorizing this 
transaction. 
12. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all 
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective 
both when made and as of the Closing, and that all such 
representations and warranties shall survive the Closing. 
13. Notice. Any notice or other communication to any 
party under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed 
to have been given on the date on which such notice is either hand 
delivered to the party to whom such notice is directed or is 
deposited in the United States mail as a certified or registered 
letter, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, properly 
addressed to such party at the address specified below: 
If to FS Financial, at: 
First Security Financial 
P. 0. Box 30006 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
Attn: Treasurer 
If to Capitol, at: 
c/o Richard A. Christenson 
2356 Dallin Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
If to Christenson, at: 
c/o First Security Financial 
135 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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With a copy to: 
Richard A. Christenson 
2356 Dallin Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
If to Moesser, at: 
c/o First Security Financial 
135 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
With a c^oy to: 
Bruce L. Moesser 
2467 East 3750 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Any such address may be changed by giving notice thereof to the 
other parties in accordance with the above procedure. 
14. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the 
benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their respective 
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns. 
15. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the 
parties, this Agreement shall be executed in four (4) counterpart 
originals, which taken together shall constitute a single agreement. 
16. Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein have 
been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not control or 
affect the meaning or interpretation of any of the terms and 
provisions hereof. 
17. Governing Law. This Agreement is entered into under 
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
18. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute 
and deliver such additional documents and to take such further 
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the 
provisions and intent of this Agreement. 
19. Severability. In the event one or more of the 
provisions contained in this Agreement shall, for any reason be held 
invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, 
illegality or unenforceability shall not affect the validity, 
legality and enforceability of any other provision hereof, and this 
Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or 
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unenforceable provision had never been contained herein, provided 
that the Agreement as so modified preserves, the basic intent of the 
parties. 
20. Construction. As used herein, all words in any gender 
shall be deemed to include the masculine, feminine, or neuter 
gender, all singular words shall include the plural, and all plural 
words shall include the singular, as the context may require. The 
term "person" shall include an individual, corporation, partnership, 
trust, estate or any other entity. 
21. Prior Agreements Superseded. This Agreement supersedes 
any prior understandings or agreement? among the parties, whether 
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, and contains 
the entire understanding of the parties with respect thereto. 
22. Enforcement. In the event of a dispute among the 
parties arising under this Agreement, the party or parties prevail-
ing in such dispute shall be entitled to collect their costs from 
the other parties, including without limitation court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL 
By ^£»*m~- 4 ^ > ^ ^ / ^ v 
Elmer D. Tucker 
Vice President 
CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY 
Richard-A^- Christenson, 
Individually 
Bruce L. Moesser, 
Individually 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
ASSETS NOT BEING PURCHASED 
Stock in Subsidiary 
Highway Health and Racquet Club 
Industrial Loan License 
Membership in ILGC 
Loans No. 's 053946 and 053947 to Child Cor, Inc . 
(principal and accrued interest) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a National Banking Association 
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, ; 
a National corporation 
Defendant. 
) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION FOR STAY 
i Case No. 870901578CN 
1 Judge Frank G. Noel 
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (the "Motion") pursuant to the remand ordeif 
entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on January 6, 1995. * 
Plaintiff 4447 Associates ("4447 Associates") moves the Court for 
entry of summary judgment and an award of damages due under the 
Asset Purchase Agreement and Closing Agreement dated December 10, 
1982 which 4447 Associates alleges are five (5) unpaid interest 
payments, the unpaid contract balance, together with interest 
thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court denied First Security's 
petition for a writ of certiorari in an order dated June 5, 1995. 
RUvessTiiiGTcou&r 
«fora J-.tficiai District 
s7\7ZD 
thereon, and its attorney fees and costs. Defendant First Security 
Financial ("First Security") opposed the Motion and asserted 
defenses contained in Utah Code Section 70A-9-318(1)(b), Section 
70A-9-318(2) and Section 70A-9-318(3) . The Motion came before the 
Court for oral argument on December 6 and 22, 1995. Prior to that 
time, the parties filed extensive memoranda in support of and in 
opposition to the Motion. First Security further filed a Motion 
for Stay which was opposed by 4447 Associates. 
Having fully considered the issues in this case, the Court 
declines at this time to grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment or Defendant's Motion for Stay. Rather, the court will at 
this time make the following findings and rulings which shall 
govern further proceedings in this case. 
1) First Security's indebtedness owed to 4447 Associates 
under the Asset Purchase Agreement, including principal and 
interest as of December 6, 1995, is $266,757.25 as shown in detail 
below. From and after December 6, 1995, interest shall continue to 
at the per diem rate of $33.51 in favor of 4447 Associates and 
against First Security. 
2 
I. UNPAID INTEREST PAYMENTS 
Due Date of Interest Unpaid Amount Accrued Interest to 
Payment December 6, 1995 
12/13/84 $21,536.07 $23,660.18 
3/13/85 24,849.31 26f687.48 
6/13/85 25,401.51 26f640.27 
9/13/85 25,401.51 26,000.01 
12/13/85 25,125.41 25,717.41 
Subtotal 122,313.81 128,705.35 
II. UNPAID CONTRACT BALANCE 
12/13/85 7,777.42 7,960.67 
(After $1,000,000 Downward 
Adjustment on 12/13/85) 
TOTAL (I & II) $266,757.25 
2) 4447 Associates' request for an award of attorney fees 
under the Asset Purchase Agreement is GRANTED in an amount to be 
determined at a later evidentiary hearing; however, 4447 Associates 
is not entitled to an award of attorney fees regarding First 
Security's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which was granted by 
the court on May 24, 1990 and affinned on appeal. 
3) First Security's defense under Section 70A-9-318(2) is 
DENIED as the Settlement Agreement dated July 10, 1985 was more 
than a modification of the contract within the meaning of Section 
70A-9-318(2); instead, the Settlement Agreement improperly 
attempted to terminate and discharge obligations owed under the 
Asset Purchase Agreement as found by the appellate court. 
4) The Court will allow First Security to marshal evidence 
in the record currently before the Court in support of its claim 
3 
that Section 70A-9-318(1)(b) is a defense to payment of the 
indebtedness described above. First Security will file and serve 
a memorandum regarding its defense under Section 70A-9-318(1)(b) on 
or before February 12, 1996. 4447 Associates will file and serve 
its response thereto on or before March 8, 1996. Thereafter, the 
Court will hold a hearing to determine whether First Security's 
alleged defense under Section 70A-9-318(1)(b) precludes the entry 
of judgment against First Security as described in this order. 
5) Defendant's argument relating to Section 70A-9-318(3) and 
Defendant's Motion to Stay are taken under advisement. 
DATED this ^ l r \ day of \~^\l& , , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: ^-^ 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Scott H. Clark 
Brent D. Wride 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
[4. 
pffrey M. Jones 
J/. Mark Gibb 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing Order On Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay to be hand-delivered this 
day of February, 1996, to the following: 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
jmg/4447msj.ord 
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*949 Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
RULES OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF THE 
COURTS 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Current with amendments received through 
11-15-97 
RULE 4-501. MOTIONS 
Intent. To establish a uniform procedure for 
filing motions, supporting memoranda and 
documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited 
dispositions. 
Applicability. This rule shall apply to motion 
practice in all district courts except proceedings 
before the court commissioners and small claims 
cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for 
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief. 
Statement of the Rule. 
(1) Filing and Service of Motions and 
Memoranda. 
(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities, appropriate affidavits, 
and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or 
other documents relied upon in support of the 
motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a 
motion shall not exceed ten pages in length 
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by 
order of the court on ex-parte application. If an 
ex-parte application is made to file an over-
length memorandum, the application shall state 
the length of the principal memorandum, and if 
the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the 
application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If 
the responding party fails to file a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion within ten days after 
service of the motion, the moving party may 
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court 
for decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of 
this rule. 
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party 
may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
*950 (d) Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to 
file a reply memorandum, either party may 
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court 
for decision. The notification shall be in the 
form of a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The 
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing 
to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the 
motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. 
The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. 
All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate 
reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, 
or requested by the parties as provided in 
paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may 
file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the 
requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
Page 2 
time. 
*951 (e) In those cases where a hearing is 
granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all 
documents supporting or opposing the motion 
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date 
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked 
as courtesy copies and indicate the date and 
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not 
be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made 
at the time the parties file their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be 
deemed waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard 
after that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and 
notice and for good cause shown, the court may 
grant a request for an expedited disposition in any 
case where time is of the essence and compliance 
with the provisions of this rule would be 
impracticable or where the motion does not raise 
significant legal issues and could be resolved 
summarily. 
(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its 
own motion or at a party's request may direct 
arguments of any motion by telephone 
conference without court appearance. A verbatim 
record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1996.] 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah general 
partnership; and Zions First National 
Bank, a 
national banking association; Plaintiffs 
and Appellant, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a Utah 
corporation, Defendant and Appellee. 
No, 930293-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 6, 1995. 
Assignee of asset purchase agreement 
appealed from judgment of the District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Frank G. Noel, J., holding 
that account debtor was not responsible under 
assignment of account of security. The Court 
of Appeals, Orme, P.J., held that: (1) 
downward adjustment value of asset purchase 
agreement at issue was to be calculated on 
agreement closing date, and not on payment 
due date; (2) account debtor received notice 
of existence of assignment prior to 
extinguishing debt as part of its settlement, 
and thus, account debtor could not extinguish 
account, for reasons not contemplated in 
underlying contract, without consent of 
assignee; and (3) account debtor had duty to 
notify assignee of pending settlement. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
vacated. 
[1] APPEAL AND ERROR k842(2) 
30k842(2) 
Appellate court reviews trial court's decision 
to grant partial summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to trial 
court's legal conclusions. 
[1] APPEAL AND ERROR k863 
30k863 
Appellate court reviews trial court's decision 
to grant partial summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to trial 
court's legal conclusions. 
[2] ASSNiNIMI NTS 1,1 \4 
38kl34 
Assignee seeking to enforce assignment had 
burden of proving account debtor received 
notice of assignment, since assignee would 
materially benefit from favorable 
determination of its rights. 
[3] APPEAL AND ERROR k842(l) 
30k842(l) 
Determination concerning whether party had 
notice or knowledge of particular transaction 
or occurrence is finding of fact and will not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, but 
determination concerning effect of notice 
presents question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
[3] APPEAL AIM 11 II! RROR k I  I MIS I (K III 
30kl008.1(8.1) 
Determination concerning whether party had 
notice or knowledge of particular transaction 
or occurrence is finding of fact and will not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, but 
determination concerning effect of notice 
presents question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Rules Civ Proc, Rule 52(a). 
[4] APPEAL AND ERROR k757(3) 
30k757(3) 
In order to challenge findings of fact, 
appellant must marshall all evidence 
supporting findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, trial court's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be against clear 
weight of evidence. 
[4] APPEAL AND ERROR kl012.1(4) 
30kl012.1(4) 
In order to challenge findings of fact, 
appellant must marshall all evidence 
supporting findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, trial court's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be against clear 
weight of evidence. 
[5] SALES k72(4) 
343k72(4) 
Downward adjustment value of asset purchase 
agreement at issue was to be calculated on 
agreement closing date, and not on payment 
due date, since contract, read in its entirety, 
unambiguously stated that adjustment in value 
was to be done three years after closing date. 
[6] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl88 
349Akl88 
Account debtor received notice of existence of 
assignment of asset purchase agreement prior 
to extinguishing debt as part of its settlement 
with asset seller, and thus, account debtor 
could not extinguish account, for reasons not 
contemplated in underlying contract, without 
consent of assignee; although account debtor 
received no written notice of assignment, and 
though debtor's president did not know 
assignment had actually been made, financial 
statements referring to assignment, submitted 
to debtor's counsel in conjunction with 
settlement, were sufficient to confer actual 
notice of assignment. 
[7] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl85.1 
349Akl85.1 
In context of assignment, Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) provision 
addressing assignments of security interests 
distinguishes between claims and defenses 
arising from contract and other unrelated 
claims and defenses, and thus, account debtor 
can assert claims and defenses based on terms 
of contract whether they arise before or after 
notification of assignment, but assertion of 
unrelated claims and defenses are limited to 
those which accrue before account debtor 
receives notification of assignment. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-318, 70A- 9-318(l)(b). 
[8] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl82 
349Akl82 
While filing financing statement is 
constructive notice that is effective for other 
purposes under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), it does not suffice 
for actual notice required in provision 
regulating assignment of security interests. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-312(5)(a), 70A-9-318. 
[9] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl31 
349Akl31 
Financing statement only offers notice that 
security interest may exist, and requires 
potential creditors to make further inquiry to 
confirm existence or specific details of 
transaction. U.C.C. § 9-402 comment. 
[10] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl85.1 
349Akl85.1 
Account debtor, unlike potential creditor, is 
not obligated to check UCC recordings 
continually to ascertain whether debt has been 
assigned, and filed financing statement offers 
no actual notice of assignments existence that 
would affect account debtor's right to assert 
subsequent claims and defenses. U.C.A.1953, 
70A-9-318(l)(b). 
[11] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl31 
349Akl31 
One can receive "notice," under Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), when it comes to 
one's attention, regardless of circumstances 
through which notice was received. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-l-201(26)(b)(i). 
[12J SECUltl II I li HNS VI I IUNS I I ^ 
349Akl88 
Account debtor had duty to notify assignee of 
asset purchase agreement of pending 
settlement with seller and debtor's president, 
which extinguished debtor's debt, since debtor 
had knowledge of assignment prior to 
settlement. U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-318(l)(b). 
[13J SECURED TR \NS\< I It INS U hi 
349Akl83 
Actual knowledge of another's property 
interest may limit one's right to acquire or 
interfere with that property, and thus, since 
secured creditor acquires personal property 
right, actual knowledge of assignment's 
existence precludes substantial interference 
with assignee's rights. U.C.A.1953, 70A-
l-201(37)(a). 
[14] SUBROGATION k31(4) 
366k31(4) 
Doctrine of equitable subrogation cannot be 
used by subsequent lender to trump prior 
intervening lien if lender had actual 
knowledge of lien. 
[15J VENDOR AND PURCHASER k72H( 1) 
400k228(l) 
Subsequent purchaser of land cannot cut off 
prior unrecorded interest in land if purchaser 
had personal knowledge of prior conveyance. 
*468 Jeffrey M. Jones and J. Mark Gibb, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
Craig Carlile and Brent D. Wride, Provo, for 
appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, ORME and WILKINS, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiff 4447 Associates appeals the trial 
court's judgment that defendant First Security 
Financial, as an account debtor, is not 
responsible to 4447 Associates under an 
assignment of the account for security. We 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
FACTS 
In December 1982, First Security Financial 
and Capitol Thrift and Loan entered into an 
asset purchase agreement, whereby First 
Security purchased substantially all of 
Capitol's assets for $1,379,911. Under the 
agreement, First Security paid $200,000 to 
Capitol at closing, with interest payments due 
quarterly and the remaining principal due in 
December 1985. [FN1] This deferred 
principal payment was subject to an offset, not 
to exceed $1,000,000, based on any 
subsequent reduction in the transferred assets' 
value prior to the 1985 due date. Also, 
Richard Christenson, Capitol's majority 
shareholder, was named president of First 
Security, but still retained the presidency of 
Capitol until June 1984. 
FN1. At closing, the parties reduced 
the purchase price to $1,207,777.42, 
leaving $1,007,777.42 as the deferred 
balance. 
*469 In June 1984, Capitol stockholders, 
including Christenson, sold all their interest 
and the remaining assets of Capitol, which 
consisted of its receivable from First Security 
and its charter, to AFS Holding Company, an 
affiliate of the Bertagnole Investment 
Company. Emanuel Floor, a Bertagnole 
partner, replaced Christenson as president of 
Capitol. 
On September 28, 1984, Bertagnole reached 
agreement with Zions Bank to restructure 
Capitol's pre-existing debt to Zions of 
$870,000 into a $1,000,000 revolving loan. 
To secure the loan, Capitol assigned Zions its 
rights to the payments due from First Security 
under the purchase agreement. In conjunction 
with the loan re-negotiation, Zions 
commercial loan officer Allen Potts and 
Bertagnole Management Company 
vice-president Ronald Mitchell obtained 
Christenson's personal guaranty for $870,000, 
the amount of the original Capitol debt owed 
to Zions. Floor executed a notice of 
assignment [FN2] as part of the loan 
documentation, and testified that all the 
documents were taken by Bertagnole 
employees to be delivered, filed, or recorded 
as appropriate. Potts testified that he 
instructed his secretary at Zions to mail a copy 
of the notice of assignment to First Security as 
per the address specified in the asset purchase 
agreement for giving notice to First Security, 
which included the notation "Attn: 
Treasurer." He did not instruct that the 
mailing be registered or certified. [FN3] 
Elmer Tucker, First Security's treasurer during 
this period, never received the notice and had 
no knowledge of the assignment until 1986. 
Zions never obtained acknowledgement from 
First Security that it had received notice of the 
assignment or of its purported obligation to 
make future payments jointly to Zions and 
Capitol, and Zions apparently never followed 
up with a written or verbal inquiry as to 
whether First Security received the notice. 
Nor, apparently, did Zions complain or inquire 
when, at the next scheduled quarterly 
payment, it did not see a check from First 
Security on which Capitol and Zions were 
shown as joint payees. 
FN2. Capitol's notice stated, in part, as 
follows: 
Notice is hereby given that Capitol... 
has assigned to Zions ... for purposes 
of security, and granted to Zions a 
security interest in all amounts owing 
to Capitol and all rights of Capitol to 
receive payment from First Security 
Financial pursuant to the aforesaid 
Asset Purchase Agreement.... 
You are hereby requested and 
instructed to make all future payments 
pursuant to said Asset Purchase 
Agreement payable jointly to Capitol 
and Zions. 
FN3. Zions's office procedure for 
handling mail is similar to that of 
many large offices. Zions employees 
who prepare letters for mailing leave 
them unstamped at designated 
locations to be picked up and 
delivered to a central mail room. 
There, other employees affix the 
appropriate postage and deposit the 
mail with the post office at the end of 
the work day. 
In November 1984, Christenson was 
terminated as president of First Security, and 
some time between December 1984 and July 
1985, he regained the position as president of 
Capitol that he had relinquished in June 1984, 
incident to the Bertagnole buyout. In order to 
resolve disagreements related to Christenson's 
departure from First Security, Christenson, 
Capitol, and First Security entered into a 
settlement agreement on July 10, 1985. 
Among its terms was an agreement by both 
Capitol and Christenson to release First 
Security from all remaining obligations under 
the 1982 asset purchase agreement, 
specifically including payment of the principal 
balance due. In conjunction with his 
negotiations with First Security, Christenson 
delivered three personal financial statements 
prior to July 1985. On each statement, 
Christenson listed as an asset his interest in 
Capitol's receivable from First Security, with 
the notation that the "receivable has been 
pledged to Zion's First National Bank." 
Capitol had made payments, via checks from 
Bertagnole, on its restructured Zions loan, but 
defaulted in December 1985. Zions notified 
First Security on February 14 and 19, 1986, 
that Capitol had defaulted and that Zions "may 
be looking" to its security interest in First 
Security's payment obligations under the 1982 
asset purchase agreement. In response, First 
Security, which denied receipt of any prior 
notice of the assignment, informed Zions that 
its debt to Capitol had been fully discharged 
as part of the July 1985 settlement accord. 
*470 On March 4, 1987, Zions filed a 
complaint against First Security, seeking a 
determination of the amount owed to Capitol 
by First Security under the asset purchase 
agreement and an order requiring First 
Security to pay Zions, as Capitol's assignee, 
this amount. First Security filed a motion 
seeking a partial summary judgment on 
February 23,1990. The trial court granted the 
motion, holding that pursuant to the asset 
purchase agreement's provision for a "change 
in value" offset to the principal payment due 
in December 1985, the amount due must be 
adjusted downward by $1,000,000, the 
maximum amount permitted under the 
agreement, given the uncontroverted evidence. 
4447 Associates, the sole appellant in this 
case, first acquired a stake in these 
proceedings when it purchased a participation 
interest in the Capitol note and collateral from 
Zions in late 1986. In June 1990, Zions 
assigned to 4447 Associates all of its 
remaining right, title, and interest in the 
Capitol note. [FN4] 
FN4. Thus, 4447 Associates emerged 
in an unenviable position: the 
assignee of an assignee of a right to 
payment that was purportedly 
extinguished by the parties to the 
underlying transaction before anything 
was ever realized on the assignment. 
The issues surviving the partial summary 
judgment were tried to the court on January 6 
and 7, 1992. Subsequently, the trial court 
issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
entered a judgment in favor of First Security 
on November 3, 1992. The trial court found 
that First Security had no duty to pay Zions, 
as assignee of Capitol's account receivable, or 
to notify Zions of its intent to settle its 
obligation to Capitol. 4447 Associates now 
appeals. 
ISSUES 
4447 Associates raises the following issues 
on appeal that merit discussion: (1) whether 
the trial court erred in finding that First 
Security did not have notice of the assignment 
of its Capitol obligation to Zions prior to 
entering into a settlement agreement that 
extinguished the obligation; (2) whether the 
trial court erred in concluding that, even with 
knowledge of the assignment, First Security 
had no duty to obtain consent from Zions 
prior to entering into the settlement 
agreement; and (3) whether the trial court 
erred in its partial summary judgment 
determination that the value offset provision 
of the asset purchase agreement reduced the 
remaining principal due by $1,000,000. [FN5] 
FN5. The parties also debate the 
question of whether First Security ever 
received, beyond mere notice of the 
assignment, notice to make payment 
directly to Zions as contemplated in 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9- 318(3) 
(1990). It clearly did not, and we 
decline to address the issue further. 
See, e.g., State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (declining to 
consider issues without merit); State 
v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 
App.1992) (same), cert, denied, 857 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] We employ several standards of review in 
resolving this appeal. We review the trial 
court's decision to grant partial summary 
judgment "for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Christensen v. Swenson, 874 
P.2d 125,127 (Utah 1994). Accord Brown v. 
Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App.1994). 
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
record indicates that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127. "In addition, we 
[examine] all relevant facts and all inferences 
arising from those facts in the light most 
favorable" to the non- moving party. Id. 
[2] Because 4447 Associates would 
materially benefit from a favorable 
determination of its rights as an assignee 
seeking to enforce an assignment, it bore the 
burden of proving First Security received 
notice of the assignment. See Bank of Salt 
Lake v. Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
534 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975). See also 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991) (party asserting that another party 
assumed assignor's liabilities has burden of 
proving assumption); First Inv. Co. v. 
Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980) 
(assignee of non-*471 negotiable notes has 
burden of proving maker issued notes for 
consideration); Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v. 
Landes, 28 Utah 2d 392, 503 P.2d 444,446 n. 
3 (1972) (assignee of account receivable has 
burden of proving account debtor had notice 
of assignment). 
[3] [4] A determination concerning whether a 
party had notice or knowledge of a particular 
transaction or occurrence is a finding of fact 
and "will not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). See Kasco 
Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 
1992) (receipt of notice of anticipatory 
repudiation is a question of fact). In order to 
challenge findings of fact, the appellant must 
marshall all evidence supporting "the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence.1 " Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 
(Utah App.1989) (quoting In re Bartell, 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). However, a 
determination concerning the effect of the 
notice presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Kasco, 831 P.2d at 89. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ASSET 
VALUE OFFSET 
[5] As indicated, First Security filed a motion 
for partial summary judgement, contending 
that, as a matter of law, the terms of the asset 
purchase agreement provided for a downward 
adjustment in the amount of $1,000,000, to be 
applied to the principal payment owed by First 
Security and due in December 1985. [FN6] 
The asset purchase agreement provided, in 
part, as follows: 
FN6. According to the closing 
statement, signed December 13, 1982, 
which finalized the asset purchase 
agreement between First Security and 
Capitol, the deferred principal due in 
December 1985 was $1,007,777.42. 
See supra note 1. With application of 
the maximum $1,000,000 offset for 
the decline in asset value, the principal 
balance owing would become 
$7,777.42. 
At the end of the three (3) year period of 
deferral and prior to the payment of the 
principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price, the real estate and 
receivables of Capitol acquired by FS 
Financial shall be valued in the manner set 
forth below. In the event that (i) the aggregate 
value of the real estate is less than its book 
value as of the Closing Date and/or (ii) the 
actual and anticipated losses on the collection 
of the amount of the receivables as of the 
Closing Date exceeds the reserve for losses as 
of the Closing Date, the principal amount of 
the deferred portion of the purchase price shall 
be adjusted downward in an equivalent 
amount. Further, the principal amount of the 
deferred portion of the purchase price shall 
also be adjusted downward in the amount of 
any liabilities of Capitol relating to the 
collection of receivables which were incurred 
in the normal course of business prior to 
Closing but were not disclosed on Capitol's 
balance sheets at Closing and which were 
assumed by FS Financial hereunder. The 
aggregate of such downward adjustments of 
the principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price shall in no event exceed 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). 
4447 Associates incorrectly asserts that the 
downward adjustment in value is to be 
calculated on the asset purchase agreement 
closing date of December 13,1982, and not on 
the payment due date of December 13, 1985, 
and that First Security's evidence did not show 
a decrease in value as of the earlier closing 
date. In support of its assertion, 4447 
Associates points to certain terms of the 
agreement, but fails to include a critical 
sentence that states the adjustment is to be 
calculated "[a]t the end of the three (3) year 
period of deferral and prior to the payment of 
the principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price." Read in its entirety, the 
contract unambiguously states that the 
adjustment in value is to be done three years 
after the closing date of December 13, 1982. 
See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah 
App.1993) (according clear and unambiguous 
contract terms "their plain and ordinary 
meaning without resorting to extrinsic 
evidence"), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 
1994). 
Moreover, although 444/ Associates 
challenges the validity of First Security's 
calculations supporting its claim of decreased 
asset *472 value, 4447 Associates offers no 
contrary affidavits or evidence to rebut these 
calculations. Thus, we are unable to find any 
evidence favorable to 4447 Associates that 
would create an issue of material fact. 
Accordingly, the trial court was correct m its 
interpretation of the asset purchase agreement 
offset provision and in its decision to grant 
partial summary judgment in favor of First 
Security. We turn now to the notice issues. 
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT 
GENERALLY 
[6J Our starting point is Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 
pertaining to secured transactions. [FN7] See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A- 9-101 to -507 (1990 
& Supp.1994). In particular, section 
70A-9-318 addresses assignments of security 
interests in accounts, and states, in part, as 
follows: 
FN7. All 50 states have adopted the 
bulk of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, see 3A Uniform Laws 
Annotated (U.C.C.) 1-2 (1992), 
developed by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws with later assistance from the 
American Law Institute. James J. 
White & Robert S. Summers, 
Handbook of the Law Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code § 1 
(1972). Comparable provisions with 
identical wording, or at least the same 
substantive meaning, exist in most of 
the various state statutory schemes. 
Thus, other courts' interpretations of 
their commercial codes may be helpful in our 
resolution of this appeal. 
Unless an account debtor has made an 
enforceable agreement not to assert defenses 
or claims arising out of a sale ... the rights of 
an assignee are subject to: 
(a) all the terms of the contract between the 
account debtor and assignor and any defense 
or claim arising therefrom; and 
(b) any other defense or claim of the account 
debtor against the assignor which accrues 
before the account debtor receives 
notification of the assignment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(l) (1990) 
(emphasis added). 
[7] Thus, in the context of an assignment, 
section 9-318 distinguishes between claims 
and defenses arising from the contract and 
other unrelated claims and defenses. An 
account debtor can assert claims and defenses 
based on the terms of the contract whether 
they arise before or after notification of an 
assignment. However, subsection (l)(b) 
limits assertion of unrelated claims and 
defenses to those "which accrue[ ] before the 
account debtor receives notification of the 
assignment." Id. § 70A-9-318(l)(b) 
(emphasis added). See also West One Bank v. 
Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 885 n. 7 (Utah 
App.1994) (secured creditor need only give 
notice of its interest in order to have priority 
over later creditor's subsequent right of 
setoff). Subsection (l)(b) does not specify a 
particular form of notice, but simply precludes 
an account debtor from raising a claim or 
defense against an assignee after the account 
debtor is aware that the assignment exists. 
[FN8] 
FN8. The two-pronged notice 
requirement mandated by Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990) is not 
applicable to our analysis. Section 
9-318(3) sets forth the notice 
requirements for an assignee to 
receive payments directly from the 
account debtor. In the instant case, the 
question of whether Zions was entitled 
to receive payments from First 
Security as they came due does not 
merit consideration. See supra note 5. 
[8][9][10] In the case at hand, First Security's 
$1,000,000 offset for the decreased value of 
the assets arose directly from the contract 
terms of its asset purchase agreement with 
Capitol. When Zions took Capitol's interest in 
the asset purchase agreement, its interest was 
subject to the terms of the original contract 
between First Security and Capitol, regardless 
of whether First Security had notice of the 
assignment. At issue here is whether First 
Security was able to extinguish the debt 
remaining after the $1,000,000 offset by 
asserting a claim or defense not arising from 
its original contract with Capitol. According 
to the terms of section 9-318(l)(b), First 
Security, as an account debtor, can only 
succeed if its claim or defense accrued before 
it received notice of the assignment's 
existence. Thus, we now consider whether 
First Security received notice of the 
assignment prior to extinguishing the debt as 
part of its settlement with Capitol and 
Christenson. 
FIRST SECURITY'S NOTICE OF THE 
ASSIGNMENT 
The UCC defines notice and the related 
concept of knowledge of a fact as follows: 
*473 A person has "notice" of a fact when: 
(i) he has actual knowledge of it; 
(ii) he has received a notice or notification 
of it; or 
(iii) from all the facts and circumstances 
known to him at the time in question he has 
reason to know that it exists. 
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a 
fact when he has actual knowledge of it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-201(25)(a), (b) 
(1990). Furthermore, one gives notice by 
taking such steps as may be reasonably 
required to inform the other person in 
ordinary course whether or not the other 
person actually comes to know of it. 
A person "receives" a notice or notification 
when: 
(i) it comes to his attention; or 
(ii) it is duly delivered at the place of 
business through which the contract was 
made or at any other place held out by him 
as the place for receipt of such 
communications. 
Id. § 70A-l-201(26)(a), (b). The trial court 
concluded that 
First Security never received adequate, legal 
notice of the Assignment sufficient to 
impose an obligation on First Security 
which would preclude First Security from 
satisfying its obligations under the Purchase 
Agreement directly with Capitol, the 
original account creditor. 
As the debate has been drawn by the parties 
in this appeal, there are three means by which 
First Security could have learned of the 
assignment sufficient to satisfy section 
1 -201 (26): by the written notice prepared by 
Floor; through the personal knowledge of 
Christenson, who for a time was First 
Security's president; and from the notation on 
Christenson's financial statements submitted 
to First Security as part of the negotiations 
culminating in the settlement agreement. 
[FN9] 
FN9. Zions perfected its security 
interest by filing a UCC-1 financing 
statement with the Utah Department of 
Commerce. While filing a financing 
statement is constructive notice that is 
effective for other purposes under 
Article 9, see Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-9-312(5)(a) (1990) (establishing 
priority among multiple security 
interests by date of filing), it does not 
suffice for the actual notice required 
under section 70A-9-318. A financing 
statement only offers notice that a 
security interest may exist, and 
requires potential creditors to make 
further inquiry to confirm the 
existence or specific details of the 
transaction. See Sannerud v. First 
Nat'l Bank, 708 P.2d 1236, 1241 
(Wyo.1985); U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 2 
(1989). An account debtor, unlike a 
potential creditor, is not obligated to 
check the UCC recordings continually 
to ascertain whether the debt has been 
assigned, and the filed financing 
statement offers no actual notice of the 
assignment's existence that would 
affect an account debtor's right to 
assert subsequent claims and defenses. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-
318(l)(b) (1990); Chase Manhattan 
Bank v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 590, 388 
N.Y.S.2d 896, 898-99, 357 N.E.2d 
366, 369 (1976) (financing statement 
not actual notice that would bar 
account debtor from asserting setoff). 
A. Written Notice 
The written notice prepared by Floor failed to 
provide adequate notice, since there is no 
evidence that First Security received it. 
Neither Capitol nor Zions mailed it registered 
or certified, and Zions did not secure written 
or oral acknowledgement of receipt from First 
Security. It is undisputed that the notice, 
addressed to the treasurer of First Security, 
was not received by then- treasurer Elmer 
Tucker. At least with respect to this 
document, the trial court did not err in finding 
that "[n]o individual representing or 
authorized to act on behalf of First Security 
received written notice of the assignment prior 
to 1986." 
B. Knowledge of Christenson 
[11] Of course, the knowledge of 
Christenson, president of First Security when 
the assignment to Zions was made by Capitol, 
can be imputed to First Security. [FN10] See, 
e.g., *474 Tuft v. Federal Leasing Inc., 657 
P.2d 1300, 1303 (Utah 1982) (corporate 
officers' knowledge of foreclosure suit 
imputed to corporation). It is evident that 
Christenson knew of the assignment by the 
time, some ten months after the assignment, 
that he agreed to the settlement with First 
Security. Still, there is nothing in the record 
to show he knew during his tenure as First 
Security president, which ended less than two 
months after the assignment was made. 4447 
Associates points to the fact that Christenson 
was a party to various discussions relative to 
Capitol's effort to refinance its obligations to 
Zions and understood that the assignment to 
Zions of Capitol's right to payment from First 
Security was under discussion. However, the 
only document Christenson signed when the 
refinance arrangement was concluded was a 
limited personal guaranty of Capitol's 
payment to Zions. There was no testimony 
showing that he had knowledge of other 
aspects of the finalized transaction, 
specifically an actual assignment by Capitol of 
its right to payment from First Security. As 
the trial court found, the discussions between 
Potts and Christenson concerned "an intent by 
Zions to enter into the agreement, [and 
preceded] execution of the Assignment by 
Capitol and Zions." 
FN10. First Security incorrectly 
argues that even if Christenson 
received notice, it was only through 
Capitol-related business dealings with 
Zions and not in his capacity as an 
officer of First Security. According to 
the UCC, one can receive notice when 
"it comes to his attention," Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-l-201(26)(b)(i) (1990), 
regardless of the circumstances 
through which the notice was 
received. Additionally, although 
Christenson may have been "wearing 
two hats," given the intertwined 
financial relationship of Christenson, 
Capitol, and First Security, both hats 
were cut from the same cloth. Thus, 
the fine distinction First Security seeks 
to draw is untenable. If Christenson 
knew of the assignment at any time 
when he was president of First 
Security, then First Security knew of 
the assignment. How Christenson 
knew is irrelevant. 
We agree with the trial court that it is not 
enough that Christenson knew Zions hoped to 
receive an assignment as security for 
repayment of Capitol's loan and that Capitol 
was willing to make such an assignment— 
Christenson had to know the assignment had 
actually been made. Thus, 4447 Associates 
failed to meet its burden of proving 
Christenson knew the assignment had been 
made at a time when he was also serving as 
First Security's president. 
C. Financial Statements 
However, notification through Christenson's 
submission to First Security of financial 
statements referring to the assignment, 
submitted in conjunction with the settlement 
agreement that purportedly extinguished the 
underlying debt between First Security and 
Capitol, cannot be dismissed as easily. 
A financial institution receives many 
financial statements in the course of its 
business, which clerical personnel may simply 
examine for compliance with the institution's 
lending guidelines. It would be too 
burdensome, as First Security contends, to 
expect scrutiny of footnotes in every financial 
statement submitted to ascertain the existence 
of an encumbering security interest that might 
affect the affairs of the receiving financial 
institution, no matter how remote from the 
transaction for which the financial statement 
was submitted. 
These particular financial statements, 
however, were submitted in the course of 
negotiations between Christenson and First 
Security to settle their respective legal 
differences and not in the ordinary course of 
First Security's general lending business. 
Furthermore, the notation stating that the 
"receivable has been pledged to Zion's First 
National Bank" concerned an asset that was at 
the core of the negotiations which culminated 
in the settlement agreement. Thus, there was 
a uniquely close nexus between the revelation 
in the financial statements and the main 
purpose of the settlement agreement. 
In addition, the trial court's factual findings 
confirm that First Security had notice through 
its receipt of the financial statements. The 
court noted the reference to the assignment in 
Christenson's financial statements, and also 
found that at least one statement "was 
delivered by Christenson's attorney to First 
Security's attorneys prior to July, 1985." Both 
First Security and 4447 Associates had 
stipulated to these facts, as well as to the 
evidence upon which the trial court based its 
findings. The court received as evidence 
correspondence between counsel for First 
Security and counsel for Christenson that 
indicated such a delivery; moreover, the 
exchange of letters was made in the context of 
documenting the settlement which featured 
the purported release of the very right to 
payment that the financial statement showed 
had been assigned to another. Counsel for 
First Security, acting as its agent, therefore 
received the financial statement and would 
have noted the assignment of the account in 
the course of examining the financial 
statement. See First Sec. Bank v. Banberry 
Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 *475 (Utah 
1990) (describing fiduciary relationship 
between attorney and client). 
Therefore, the trial court incorrectly 
concluded, contrary to its own findings of 
fact, that "First Security never received 
adequate, legal notice of the Assignment 
sufficient to impose an obligation on First 
Security." The notation on the financial 
statements indicating Zions's interest in the 
account was sufficient to confer actual notice 
of the assignment on First Security. 
Accordingly, First Security was not free to 
extinguish the account in the context of the 
settlement agreement with Capitol and 
Christenson, for reasons not contemplated in 
the underlying contract, without the consent of 
Zions. [FN11] 
FN11. We do not suggest that an 
account cannot be modified in any 
way after notice of assignment is 
received. The account debtor and the 
assignor are free to make changes as 
provided by the original account 
contract or which may be 
commercially reasonable within the 
context of the transaction. However, 
the settlement agreement in this case 
unilaterally extinguished the account 
in an effort to resolve legal differences 
totally unrelated to, and not 
contemplated in, the original contract. 
DUTY IMPOSED BY NOTH T 
[12][13][14][15] The trial court in the instant 
case made the following conclusion pertinent 
to any duty imposed on First Security through 
actual knowledge or notice of the assignment's 
existence: 
Knowledge of the existence of the 
Assignment alone, if any such knowledge 
existed, did not impose a duty to inquire on 
First Security. 
This conclusion does not ring true. A 
familiar principle of the law, particularly in 
secured transactions, is that actual knowledge 
of another's property interest may limit one's 
right to acquire or interfere with that property. 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-301(l)(c), 
(d) (1990) (buyer not in ordinary course of 
business purchases collateral free of an 
unperfected security interest only if buyer has 
no actual knowledge of interest). [FN 12] 
FN12. Likewise, in the context of 
property law, actual knowledge is a 
critical factor. For example, the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation 
cannot be used by a subsequent lender 
to trump a prior intervening lien if the 
lender had actual knowledge of the 
lien. Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l 
Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 609 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993). A subsequent purchaser of 
land cannot cut off a prior unrecorded 
interest in the land if the purchaser had 
personal knowledge of the prior 
conveyance. Utah Farm Prod. Credit 
Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 
906 n. 2 (Utah 1987). 
Accordingly, since a secured creditor acquires 
a personal property right, see id. § 
70A-l-201(37)(a), actual knowledge of the 
assignment's existence precludes substantial 
interference with the assignee's rights. Legal 
commentators have noted that under the UCC, 
an assignee's rights may be adversely affected 
by contract modifications made by the account 
debtor and the assignor, but such actions are 
"unwarranted" if the assignee's rights are 
jeopardized by termination of the contract or 
similar unilateral action. 9 Hawkland, Lord & 
Lewis, UCC Series § 9-318:01 (Callaghan 
1991). See also In re Apex Oil Co., 975 F.2d 
1365, 1370 (8th Cir.1992) (holding company 
acted unreasonably by setting off debt after 
receiving notice of third party's security 
interest in same debt). 
Given these principles and a plain reading of 
section 9-318(l)(b), which allows an account 
debtor to raise claims and defenses against the 
assignee not arising from the original contract 
only before it receives notice of the 
assignment, the trial court incorrectly 
concluded that knowledge alone did not 
impose any duty upon First Security. [FN13] 
We hold that First Security had a duty to 
notify Zions of the pending settlement with 
Capitol and Christenson. Its failure to do so 
entitles 4447 Associates to an award of 
damages resulting therefrom, presumably the 
amount due on the account, as properly 
reduced in accordance with the terms of the 
asset purchase agreement as discussed above. 
FN13. "[I]f the obligation assigned 
could be obliterated or diminished by 
events happening after the assignment 
and notice of the assignment to the 
obligor, the assignment would be 
precarious collateral." Seattle-First 
Nat'l Bank v. Oregon Pac. Indus., Inc., 
262 Or. 578, 500 P.2d 1033, 1035 
(1972) (en banc). See also Larry D. 
Bishop, Note, Commercial 
Transactions: Protection of the 
Account Debtor Within and Without 
UCC § 9-318(1), 35 Okla.L.Rev. 415, 
420-25 (1982) (explaining rights and 
responsibilities of account debtor after 
receiving notification of assignment). 
*476 CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's decision to grant 
partial summary judgment in favor of First 
Security, thereby allowing the value 
adjustment of $1,000,000 on the principal 
amount owed by First Security under the asset 
purchase agreement. We conclude that notice 
of an assignment's existence precludes an 
account debtor from extinguishing the account 
post-assignment, and thereby substantially 
interfering with the assignee's interest, for 
reasons other than those contemplated by the 
terms of the underlying obligation. First 
Security had such notice through the financial 
statement submitted to its attorneys. 
Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in 
part, and remand to the trial court for entry of 
an appropriate judgment in favor of 4447 
Associates in accordance with this opinion. 
BILLINGS and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
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